Ticker: Z (Zillow Group, Inc. – Class C) Title Context: A new investor class-action lawsuit has been filed against Zillow Group, with an August 10, 2026 deadline for shareholders to seek lead-plaintiff status (marketchameleon.com) (www.globenewswire.com). This report examines Zillow’s fundamentals – dividend policy, leverage, valuation, and key risks – to inform investors ahead of that legal cutoff. All facts are drawn from official filings and reputable financial sources.
Dividend Policy & Shareholder Returns
Zillow Group has never paid a cash dividend on its common or capital stock (www.sec.gov). Management’s stated policy is to retain all earnings for business growth, with no plans to initiate dividends “in the foreseeable future” (www.sec.gov). As a result, Zillow’s dividend yield is 0%, and income investors have not received payouts.
– Dividend History: None – no dividends have ever been declared or paid (www.sec.gov). Zillow’s 10-K explicitly confirms this no-dividend policy and notes the intent to reinvest profits into expansion rather than shareholder distributions (www.sec.gov). In mid-2025, third-party market data likewise showed no regular dividend on either Class A (ZG) or Class C (Z) shares (www.bitget.com).
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– Share Buybacks: Instead of dividends, Zillow returns capital via stock repurchases. In May 2025, the Board boosted the buyback authorization to $3.5 billion (cumulative, no expiration) (www.sec.gov). Under this program, Zillow bought back ~$670 million of stock in 2025 – repurchasing ~8 million Class A shares at an average $70.11 and ~1 million Class C shares at $73.19 (www.sec.gov). These 2025 repurchases equated to roughly 3.7% of shares outstanding, indicating a meaningful effort to improve shareholder value per share. As of year-end 2025, $711 million remained authorized for future buybacks (www.sec.gov).
Takeaway: Zillow has no dividend income component – its shareholder return strategy has centered on buybacks. Investors seeking yield won’t find it here, but the ongoing repurchase authorization signals management’s focus on returning excess cash via share reductions rather than dividends.
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Balance Sheet, Leverage & Coverage
Balance sheet health: Zillow carries a strong liquidity position and modest debt. As of December 31, 2025, Zillow held $1.3 billion in cash, investments, and restricted cash (www.sec.gov). This was down from $1.9 billion a year prior (www.sec.gov), largely due to retiring debt and funding buybacks (uses of cash detailed below). Even after these outflows, Zillow believes its cash on hand and operating cash flow are sufficient to fund at least 12 months of operations and growth initiatives without needing to tap credit lines (www.sec.gov).
– Debt profile: Zillow eliminated all its long-term bond debt by 2025, notably retiring several convertible note issues. The company had issued Convertible Senior Notes maturing in 2024, 2025, and 2026, but fully settled these ahead of maturity. In 2024, Zillow redeemed its $499 million 2026 Notes, prompting holders to convert ~$498 million; Zillow paid $498 million cash and issued ~4.5 million shares to settle those conversions (www.sec.gov). Likewise, the 2025 Notes ($419 million principal) were settled at maturity in May 2025 with $425 million cash (covering principal + interest) (www.sec.gov). Earlier, the 2024 Notes ($608 million principal) were converted by holders and settled in cash ($608 million) plus ~1.9 million shares by September 2024 (www.sec.gov). After these redemptions, Zillow has no outstanding senior bonds or notes; its only debt obligations are revolving facilities tied to its mortgage operations (and standard lease liabilities).
– Credit facilities (mortgage financing): Zillow’s subsidiary Zillow Home Loans uses short-term “master repurchase agreements” (warehouse credit lines) to fund mortgage originations. As of year-end 2025, Zillow had four such facilities (JPMorgan, Bank of Montreal, UBS, Bank of Nova Scotia) with a combined $600 million borrowing capacity (www.sec.gov). Drawn balances were about $364 million at 12/31/2025 (up from $145 million a year prior as mortgage volumes grew) (www.sec.gov). These loans are collateralized by mortgages held-for-sale and turn over quickly – principal is repaid once Zillow sells each funded loan to investors or agencies (www.sec.gov). The credit lines have staggered maturities in 2026 (e.g. April 2026 for the JPM line, June 2026 for Scotia, etc.) (www.sec.gov), and Zillow has routinely renewed or replaced them (several were upsized or newly added in 2025 (www.sec.gov)). Importantly, these borrowings finance short-term assets (loans to be sold), so they don’t represent a structural long-term debt burden.
– New revolving credit (undrawn): In January 2026, Zillow secured a $500 million revolving credit facility with a syndicate led by Goldman Sachs (www.sec.gov). This general corporate revolver can be increased to $750 million and matures January 2031 (www.sec.gov). It bears interest at floating rates (SOFR or base rate + margin, tied to Zillow’s leverage ratio) (www.sec.gov). As of the latest filings, Zillow had not drawn on this revolver (www.sec.gov) – it serves as a liquidity backstop. The company states it may utilize the revolver as needed, but expects to meet longer-term cash needs through operating cash flow and, if warranted, additional debt or equity financing (www.sec.gov).
– Interest and coverage: Zillow’s interest expense is very low relative to earnings. In 2025, interest expense was only $18 million (www.sec.gov), reflecting the cost of the short-term mortgage credit lines (and a partial-year of interest on converts before payoff). This was fully offset by interest and other income (Zillow earned ~$77 million in net “other income” in 2025, largely from interest on its cash/investments) (www.sec.gov). By an EBITDA basis, Zillow’s interest coverage is extremely strong: Adjusted EBITDA was $622 million in 2025 (www.sec.gov), which is over 30× the gross interest expense. Even on a GAAP basis, 2025 net income ($23 million) plus interest ($18 million) and depreciation ($264 million) show ample cash flow to cover debt service. Bottom line: Zillow is essentially in a net cash position (cash > debt) and faces no strain meeting its minimal interest obligations. The company also remains in compliance with all debt covenants on its facilities (www.sec.gov).
Maturities outlook: With the convertibles gone, Zillow has no significant debt maturities in the near term. The mortgage credit facilities will come due on various dates in 2026, but these are expected to roll over or be refinanced as normal course (and are matched by short-term assets). The $500M revolver extends to 2031 and is undrawn (www.sec.gov). This favorable maturity schedule, alongside robust liquidity, gives Zillow flexibility. The main coverage considerations now are ensuring mortgage warehouse lines keep functioning (they do contain covenants and margin call provisions typical for such financing (www.sec.gov) (www.sec.gov)) – Zillow must maintain adequate collateral and equity in its mortgage business, but to date has managed this risk. Overall leverage is low, and Zillow’s balance sheet strength is a positive for investors.
Earnings, Cash Flow & Valuation
Operating performance: Zillow’s core business stabilized after its 2021 exit from home-flipping. By 2025, the company returned to profitability on a GAAP basis and solid cash generation. Key highlights:
– Revenue mix: Zillow operates in segments including “Premier Agent” advertising (For Sale), Rentals, Mortgages, and Other. In the first quarter of 2026, for example, total revenue was $708 million, up 18% year-on-year as the real estate market showed signs of recovery (www.prnewswire.com) (www.prnewswire.com). “For Sale” (agent advertising and related services) contributed $514 million in Q1 2026 (12% YoY growth), while Rentals revenue grew 42% to $183 million (www.prnewswire.com) (www.prnewswire.com). This surge in Rentals reflects the expanded inventory and traffic Zillow gained from its deal with Redfin (discussed later). Mortgage revenue is smaller ($64 million in Q1 2026, up 56% YoY as Zillow Home Loans scaled origination volume) (www.prnewswire.com). Overall 2025 full-year revenues were around $2.0–2.5 billion (estimate based on quarterly trends), indicating Zillow has regained a growth trajectory despite a sluggish housing sector.
– Profitability: Zillow achieved GAAP net income of $23 million for 2025 (www.sec.gov), a notable improvement from a $(112)$ million loss in 2024. While $23 million is a slim bottom line (about 1% net margin), it marks a positive turn. Net profit was aided by expense discipline and the absence of prior losses from the now-shuttered Zillow Offers homebuying segment. Adjusted EBITDA in 2025 reached $622 million, up 25% from 2024 (www.sec.gov), with an adjusted EBITDA margin of ~24%. Zillow’s high operating leverage is evident: small increases in revenue, combined with cost cuts, drove much larger proportional gains in EBITDA. In Q1 2026, Zillow posted $46 million in net income (diluted EPS $0.19) on $708 million revenue (www.prnewswire.com) – significantly above the $8 million profit in Q1 2025 (www.prnewswire.com). Cash flow is also healthy: Zillow reported $368 million in operating cash flow for 2025 (www.sec.gov), reflecting strong adjusted profits and working-capital release as the homes business wound down. This cash generation helped fund the debt repayments and buybacks noted earlier.
– Funds From Operations (FFO/AFFO): Not applicable. Investors sometimes look at FFO/AFFO metrics for real estate companies, but Zillow is not a REIT and does not use FFO/AFFO. Zillow’s earnings are derived from services and software (not property rental income), so GAAP net income and Adjusted EBITDA are more appropriate performance measures. (In Zillow’s case, depreciation is mostly from acquired intangibles and capitalized development, rather than owning physical properties long-term – thus FFO conventions don’t apply.)
Valuation metrics: Zillow’s stock price has fluctuated with its strategic pivots. After the home-flipping exit, the market’s focus returned to Zillow’s online real estate portal fundamentals. Here is how the valuation looks as of mid-2026:
– Market Capitalization: Roughly $7–8 billion. Zillow has about 240 million combined Class A, B, and C shares outstanding (www.sec.gov). At a recent price around the mid-$30s per share, market cap is in the high single-digit billions. For context, Zillow’s market cap was much higher at the peak of the housing boom (stock over $100 in early 2021), but has since normalized.
– Price/Earnings (P/E): Extremely high on a trailing basis. Because 2025 GAAP earnings were very small ($0.09 EPS (www.sec.gov)), Zillow’s trailing P/E is over 700×. Market data shows a ~758× P/E for 2025 (www.marketscreener.com) – essentially not meaningful. This sky-high multiple reflects the fact that Zillow’s earnings are just above breakeven. However, looking forward, analysts expect earnings to ramp up in coming years as the company’s initiatives bear fruit. Forecast P/E drops to ~64× in 2026 and ~34× in 2027 (www.marketscreener.com), based on consensus growth estimates. In short, Zillow’s stock is priced for significant earnings growth; current profits are low relative to the valuation.
– EV/EBITDA: A more useful metric given Zillow’s large non-cash expenses. Zillow’s enterprise value is about $7.6 billion (market cap plus minimal net debt) and its TTM EBITDA is ~$346 million, yielding an EV/EBITDA of ~22× (valueinvesting.io). This multiple (~22×) is high but not unheard of for a tech-oriented platform with double-digit growth. It indicates a rich valuation, albeit far lower than the P/E multiple. By EBITDA, Zillow is valued roughly in line with other online marketplace peers. For example, competitor CoStar Group – which runs Apartments.com and is expanding into residential – also trades at elevated EBITDA multiples (CoStar’s forward P/E has been in the 50–60× range, reflecting growth expectations). Zillow’s EV/sales is around 3–4× (estimated $7.6B EV / ~$2.1B revenue), and Price/Book ~2.2× (Zillow’s book value was ~$3.7B, mainly equity from past stock issuance and retained earnings) (www.marketscreener.com).
– Comparables: Direct public comps are limited since most online real-estate portals are either smaller or not standalone public companies. Redfin (RDFN) was a hybrid portal and brokerage but has been struggling (and, as noted below, agreed to be acquired). Realtor.com is owned by News Corp, and smaller competitors like Opendoor (OPEN) or Offerpad are focused on iBuying (with very different financial profiles). Zillow is often compared to internet marketplace firms or tech-enabled brokers. The closest analog may be CoStar (CSGP) given CoStar’s push into residential listings – CoStar’s market cap (~$30B) and revenue (~$2B) are similar order of magnitude, though CoStar is more profitable. On balance, Zillow’s valuation suggests that investors are pricing in its market-leading position and future growth (e.g. monetizing its huge user base with new products), but also acknowledging execution risks. The stock is not “cheap” by traditional metrics; it trades at a premium that assumes continued improvement in margins and earnings.
Stock performance context: Zillow shares remain well below their 2021 highs, reflecting the fallout of the failed Zillow Offers venture and subsequent reset. Over the past year, the stock has traded in roughly the $35–$55 range, influenced by interest rate movements (which affect housing activity) and now by legal news. The current valuation leaves some room for upside if Zillow’s multi-year strategy (integrating real estate search, financing, and services with AI and a “housing super-app” approach) delivers significant earnings growth. But it also implies vulnerability – any setbacks (in revenue growth or legal issues) could pressure the stock given its elevated multiples. This brings us to the key risks and red flags.
Risks, Red Flags & Open Questions
Investors in Zillow should be aware of several risk factors and unresolved issues, some of which are central to the newly filed class-action lawsuit:
– 📉 Housing Market Cyclicality: Zillow’s fortunes are tied to housing-market activity. Rising mortgage rates and low inventory have dampened home sales, which in turn limit demand for Zillow’s agent advertising and mortgage services (www.sec.gov) (www.sec.gov). While Zillow outperformed the industry in early 2026 (Q1 revenue +18% vs market +2% (www.prnewswire.com) (www.prnewswire.com)), a protracted housing slowdown could stall growth. This macro risk is largely out of Zillow’s control. A key open question is when will housing activity normalize? If high rates keep transactions depressed, Zillow’s revenue (especially Premier Agent) may stagnate or decline in the near term.
– 🏦 Competition and Disruption: Zillow faces growing competitive threats. CoStar Group, a heavyweight in commercial real estate data, is aggressively entering the residential listings space (via its Homes.com platform) to challenge Zillow’s dominance. CoStar has significant resources and is offering free leads to brokers, which could erode Zillow’s pricing power with agents. Traditional brokerage franchises and MLS (Multiple Listing Services) are also wary of Zillow – in one recent case, an MLS in Chicago attempted to block Zillow’s access to listings, resulting in a legal fight (www.axios.com). Additionally, Rocket Companies (NYSE:RKT) in 2025 announced a deal to acquire Zillow’s rival Redfin for $1.75 billion (www.axios.com). Rocket (the parent of Rocket Mortgage) could leverage Redfin’s user base and agent network to create a more integrated real estate portal, posing a longer-term threat to Zillow. These developments raise questions about Zillow’s moat: Can Zillow maintain its lead in audience and content if well-funded new entrants (or combinations like Rocket-Redfin) intensify competition? The risk is that user traffic or listings could fragment across platforms, forcing Zillow to spend more on marketing or innovation to keep users engaged.
– ⚖️ Legal and Regulatory Risks: Zillow is now entangled in significant legal challenges:
– FTC Antitrust Lawsuit: In September 2025, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), joined by several states, sued Zillow and Redfin for an alleged illegal agreement in the rental listings market (search.ftc.gov) (search.ftc.gov). The FTC claims Zillow paid Redfin $100 million to “dismantle Redfin as a competitor” in rental home advertising (search.ftc.gov) (search.ftc.gov). In February 2025, Zillow and Redfin had announced what they called a “partnership” to syndicate Redfin’s rental listings on Zillow’s platform. But regulators assert this was effectively a non-compete pact: Redfin allegedly shut down its own rentals advertising business and handed that business to Zillow in exchange for payment (search.ftc.gov) (search.ftc.gov). This, per the FTC, “eliminates Redfin as a competitor” in online rental listings, harming competition (search.ftc.gov) (www.cbsnews.com). Zillow strongly disputes the allegations, claiming the agreement is pro-competitive and benefits consumers (by exposing property managers’ listings to a broader audience) (www.cbsnews.com). Regardless, this case is a major overhang: a federal judge in May 2026 refused to dismiss the FTC’s lawsuit, meaning it will proceed in court (www.multifamilydive.com). Potential consequences could include a forced unwinding of the Zillow-Redfin deal, fines, and restrictions on Zillow’s business practices. Notably, Zillow’s Rentals segment has been growing rapidly (Q1 2026 rentals revenue +42% YoY (www.prnewswire.com)), in part due to absorbing Redfin’s clients. If the deal is undone or Zillow is barred from certain exclusivity, that growth could slow. Investors will need to monitor this antitrust battle – it directly targets one of Zillow’s growth plays and could shape how Zillow can do business with erstwhile competitors.
– Securities Class-Action Lawsuit: The “urgent” impetus for this report is the new class-action filed on behalf of Zillow investors, which appears directly related to the Redfin agreement and antitrust issues. The complaint (filed June 2026) alleges that Zillow misled investors about the nature and risks of its Redfin deal (www.globenewswire.com). According to the plaintiff’s claims, Zillow portrayed the Redfin arrangement as a benign “partnership,” while in reality it was effectively an acquisition of Redfin’s rentals business (www.globenewswire.com). The suit further asserts that Zillow failed to disclose the heightened antitrust risk of this deal (www.globenewswire.com). Even after the FTC and states filed suit (publicly revealing the arrangement), Zillow allegedly downplayed its legal exposure (www.globenewswire.com). If these allegations are true, it means Zillow’s management potentially violated securities laws by not informing investors of material risks. The class action covers investors who bought Zillow stock during the affected period (likely February 2025 through late 2025, though the exact class period will be defined in the case). The deadline to join as a lead plaintiff is August 10, 2026 (marketchameleon.com) (www.globenewswire.com). While the outcome is uncertain, such litigation poses reputational and financial risk. Zillow may face legal costs (already, legal expenses were up by $11 million in Q1 2026 due to “incremental legal expenses” related to these matters (www.prnewswire.com)) and possible settlement or judgment down the line. A recent precedent: Zillow previously settled a 2017–2020 investor lawsuit for $15 million (11th.com), which had alleged failure to disclose a federal probe into Zillow’s co-marketing program violating RESPA (real estate anti-kickback law) (11th.com). That prior case shows Zillow has hit legal bumps before. The new case’s allegations are arguably more serious, implicating C-suite decisions around a nine-figure deal. Investors should keep a close eye on this class action’s progress; at a minimum, it could distract management and generate negative headlines over the next 12–18 months.
– Other Litigation: Beyond the headline antitrust and securities cases, Zillow operates in a litigative environment. For example, Compass (a real estate brokerage) sued Zillow in 2025 alleging anticompetitive aspects of Zillow’s agent listing rules (apnews.com). Zillow successfully fended off Compass’s injunction attempt, and Compass dropped the suit in March 2026 (www.wsgr.com). Also, Zillow faces occasional IP and patent claims, and must navigate regulatory compliance in real estate (e.g. consumer privacy, RESPA, fair housing advertising rules). While none of these appear existential, they collectively mean legal risk is an ongoing factor for Zillow. The company’s scale and industry-changing moves make it a target for competitors’ and regulators’ scrutiny.
– Tech & Execution Risks: Zillow’s strategy heavily emphasizes technological innovation (e.g. integrating AI into real estate search and transactions (www.prnewswire.com)). Rapid tech changes carry risk – Zillow must invest continuously to improve its Zestimate AVM, touring/booking tools, and customer experience. Any failure or delays in deploying new features could let competitors catch up. Additionally, Zillow’s pivot to a “housing super-app” means it’s trying to streamline a very complex process (buying, selling, financing, renting – all in one ecosystem). Execution missteps – whether in product development or partnerships with brokers and builders – could hamper growth. The flame-out of Zillow Offers (home flipping) in 2021 underscores that even Zillow can stumble with new initiatives. Investors should question how well Zillow can execute on mortgages and closing services, which are relatively new areas for the company and come with their own margin and risk profiles. Open question: Will Zillow’s expansion into adjacent services (mortgages, title, rentals, new construction) materially boost profits, or will these just offset declines in its core advertising if agent commissions compress industry-wide?
– Economic & Interest Rate Risk: Zillow benefits from a robust economy and consumer mobility. High interest rates and recession risk are red flags – they can reduce home sales volume and real estate advertising spend. Zillow’s 2025–2026 results have shown resilience, but if inflation or unemployment spike, housing demand could fall sharply. Moreover, Zillow Home Loans could face credit risk or liquidity risk if mortgage markets tighten (although Zillow mainly resells loans and doesn’t hold long-term credit risk, a severe downturn could still create repurchase risks or force it to hold unsold loans). The company’s own disclosures warn that changes in interest rates and housing affordability directly influence its financial performance (www.sec.gov) (www.sec.gov). Investors need to be aware that Zillow’s cyclical exposure remains – it is not immune to macroeconomic swings.
– Insider Control and Share Structure: Zillow has a dual-class share structure: Class A (ticker ZG) with 1 vote per share, and Class C (ticker Z) with no voting rights. It also has Class B shares (held by founders and insiders) with super-voting power. As of Feb 2026, co-founder Executive Chairman Richard Barton and other insiders held ~6.2 million Class B shares (10 votes each) in addition to common shares (www.sec.gov), giving insiders effective voting control. This governance setup means public Class C shareholders have no say in corporate matters. While common in tech companies, it’s a governance risk – decisions can be made even if public shareholders disagree, and activist intervention is virtually impossible. Investors should be comfortable with current leadership’s vision, as checks and balances are limited. The class-action lawsuit also raises the issue: were shareholders misled partly because management could act without sufficient accountability? It’s an angle to consider when weighing the corporate governance risk.
In sum, Zillow’s risk profile is a mix of market-driven risks (housing cycle, competition) and idiosyncratic risks (legal challenges, strategy execution). The red flags around the Redfin deal have clearly caught regulators’ and litigators’ attention, introducing a new cloud over the stock. How Zillow navigates these issues in the coming year will be critical.
Conclusion & Investor Considerations
Zillow Group’s fundamental picture shows a company with a strong financial foundation (low debt, positive cash flow) and a rejuvenated focus on its core real estate marketplace business. It no longer carries the balance-sheet risks of home inventory, and its lack of dividend is balanced by active share buybacks. The business is returning to growth, and profitability – though still modest – is improving. By traditional metrics, the stock isn’t cheap, but Zillow commands a premium due to its dominant position and potential to increase monetization of its huge user base (236 million average monthly users as of 2025, per company reports).
However, investors must weigh the current uncertainties. The securities class-action lawsuit filed in June 2026 is a stark reminder of the legal and governance challenges facing Zillow. Shareholders who purchased Zillow stock during the period of the alleged misstatements (likely around Feb–Nov 2025) should be aware of their rights and the upcoming deadline. August 10, 2026 is the cutoff for affected investors to petition the court to be lead plaintiff in the suit (marketchameleon.com) (www.globenewswire.com). Importantly, you do not need to be lead plaintiff to partake in any eventual recovery – all class members can benefit if the suit succeeds – but being lead plaintiff allows one to represent the class’s interests. Typically, the investor with the largest losses who is willing to serve will be appointed to that role (www.globenewswire.com).
Given the potential impact of the allegations (which claim Zillow kept investors in the dark about a significant antitrust risk (www.globenewswire.com)), shareholders should closely follow this case. If you believe you were financially harmed by the stock’s decline when the FTC’s action came to light, it may be prudent to consult with the law firms involved or your legal adviser about joining the class. The lawsuit’s outcome could possibly result in monetary compensation or corporate governance reforms – outcomes that investors have a stake in.
In the near term, Zillow’s stock may remain volatile as news develops on these fronts. Positive housing data or earnings beats could boost shares, while any negative headlines from the FTC case or class-action (or a broader market downturn) could hurt them. Investors should stay alert for updates on: (1) Zillow’s Q2 and Q3 2026 results – will legal issues start affecting spending or guidance? (2) Any settlement talks or court rulings in the FTC suit (e.g. if a settlement requires Zillow to unwind the Redfin deal, it could dent Rentals revenue projections), and (3) progress of the shareholder class action (if it survives initial motions to dismiss, etc., Zillow might consider a settlement or face a trial down the road).
Act Before the Deadline: For those investors who do want to pursue legal recourse, the message is urgent – the clock is ticking toward the August 10, 2026 deadline (marketchameleon.com). Failing to act by then could forfeit your ability to lead or influence the class’s recovery. Even if you simply remain an absent class member, being informed is important. Resources such as the Faruqi & Faruqi notice and the Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman notice (prominent securities litigation firms) provide instructions for contacting them and documenting your trades (www.globenewswire.com) (www.globenewswire.com).
Bottom line: Zillow Group offers an intriguing investment story – a leader in an essential industry with improving financials – but it also carries noteworthy risks at the moment. Investors should weigh those risks carefully. If you are a current or former shareholder who bought during the class period, ensure you’ve evaluated the class-action opportunity. And all Zillow investors should keep a close watch on how the Redfin antitrust saga unfolds, as it will likely influence Zillow’s strategy and perhaps its valuation. The coming months could be pivotal for “Z” investors, making due diligence and timely action more important than ever.
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Sources:
– Zillow Group 2025 Annual Report (Form 10-K) – Dividend Policy & Capital Allocation (www.sec.gov) (www.sec.gov); Debt and Liquidity (www.sec.gov) (www.sec.gov); Convertible Notes Settlement (www.sec.gov) (www.sec.gov); Cash and Investments (www.sec.gov); Interest Expense (www.sec.gov); Financial Performance (www.sec.gov) (www.sec.gov).
– Zillow Q1 2026 Shareholder Letter & Press Release – Quarterly Revenue and Earnings (www.prnewswire.com) (www.prnewswire.com); Adjusted EBITDA and Margin (www.prnewswire.com).
– Slickcharts & Bitget Finance – Confirmation of No Dividend History (www.sec.gov) (www.bitget.com).
– Yahoo Finance/MarketScreener – Valuation Ratios (P/E, P/B) (www.marketscreener.com).
– ValueInvesting.io – EV/EBITDA calculation (mid-2026) (valueinvesting.io).
– FTC Press Release (Sept 30 2025) – Details of Zillow-Redfin Rental Advertising Agreement and $100 M Payment (search.ftc.gov) (search.ftc.gov).
– CBS News (Sept 30 2025) – FTC allegations of Zillow paying Redfin to exit competition (www.cbsnews.com) (www.cbsnews.com).
– Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman LLP Press Release (Jun 11 2026) – Investor Class-Action Allegations (Zillow’s statements on Redfin deal false/misleading) (www.globenewswire.com).
– Faruqi & Faruqi LLP Press Release (Jun 12 2026) – Class Action Deadline August 10 2026 reminder (marketchameleon.com) (www.globenewswire.com).
– 11th Judicial District summary – Prior $15 M Settlement (2023) over Co-Marketing/RESPA probe nondisclosure (11th.com).
– Multifamily Dive and Law360 coverage – FTC case status update (May 2026) and Compass antitrust suit outcome (www.multifamilydive.com) (www.wsgr.com).
– Axios & AP News – Competitive and Industry Moves (Rocket acquiring Redfin; MLS blocking Zillow) (www.axios.com) (www.axios.com).
For informational purposes only; not investment advice.